Summer Reading: Jonathan Rauch on the Positives of Machines

Submitted by Anonymous on Wed, 06/24/2015 - 11:02

Last month, Jonathan Rauch published a sincere and well-written defense of political machines, entitled "Political Realism: How Hacks, Machines, Big Money, and Back-Room Deals Can Strengthen American Democracy" (Brooking Institution Press; <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2015/political-realism">availab… free as a PDF or e-book</a>). Although the essay scarcely mentions conflicts of interest, gifts, nepotism, and the like, and it makes no mention at all of conflicts of interest programs, ethics advice, or lobbying, it is essential reading. 
 
Rauch's argument is that the U.S. has become ungovernable and extremist because, for different reasons, progressive, populist, and libertarian reformers have convinced the public and the news media that "transactional politics" is a bad thing. Also, by attacking money in politics, reformers have taken power away from the political parties, which has had the effect of empowering wealthy and often extreme individuals ("grandstanders and solo entrepreneurs"). This has meant that "amateur" politicians have been given too much power, and "professionals" can no longer keep order and make sure that compromises are reached and that, therefore, government works. 
 
There is certainly some truth to this argument, at least at the federal level (although recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions should also be emphasized for empowering the wealthy and the extreme by allowing unlimited independent spending). If Rauch had, like most writers in this field, limited himself to what he refers as the past "political machine" in Congress, there would be no reason for this blog post. Unfortunately, since he uses the word "machine," Rauch cannot help but bring city machines into his argument (especially New York City and Richmond), and this is where he goes seriously wrong. (For critiques of the essay focused on the federal government, see Thomas E. Mann and E. J. Dionne, Jr., <a href="http://brook.gs/1GcuFf8">"The futility of nostalgia and the romanticism of the new political realists"</a> (Brookings Institution, June 2015), and Mark Schmitt, <a href="http://www.democracyjournal.org/36/democratic-romanticism-and-its-criti… href="http://www.democracyjournal.org/36/democratic-romanticism-and-its-criti… Romanticism and Its Critics</a><a href="http://www.democracyjournal.org/36/democratic-romanticism-and-its-criti…; Democracy: A Journal of Ideas (Spring 2015).) 
 
"Transactional Politics" at the Local Level 
One of the principal problems with Rauch's argument is his presentation of "transactional politics." He describes it as "the everyday give-and-take of dickering and compromise." Making deals and making them stick. Finding an equilibrium, getting results. The problem is that throughout the book Rauch assumes that the deal-making and compromising involves policies. 
 
At the local level, politics is mostly about providing services and regulating development, not about policies and ideas. Local "amateurs" are usually people who oppose taxes or certain developments, because they don't want to pay the taxes or have the development in their backyard or in the park they enjoy. There are a few environmental activists and religious individuals who run for school board to prevent the teaching of evolution and climate change, but this is not the norm. 
 
While "machines" at the federal level make deals to pass laws, "machines" at the local level primarily make deals that involve contracts, developments, grants, subsidies, and the like. It isn't so much about the money in politics, it's about the money in government and the use of land. Rauch doesn't discuss these aspects of city "machines." Even with Tammany Hall, he focuses on its social welfare accomplishments. That's not a realistic picture. 
 
The closest Rauch gets to typical local deals is talking about earmarks, but only in terms of how useful they are in "buying support" from legislators when it comes to policy issues. At the local level, support is more likely to be bought in order to get a development project built or to make trades with respect to contracts or grants. At the federal level, earmarks have always been a tiny percentage of expenditures and a small part of what Congress does. At the local level, the equivalent of earmarks is a large part of what a council does. 
 
Also, at the local level, "machines" usually do not involve parties dickering. They are usually one-party cities, and those of the other party are generally co-opted, at least if they are looking for power or patronage. Even when there are two parties, there are not many ideological battles and gridlock involving policies is rare. And yet gridlock is, for Rauch, one of the worst results of what reformers have done to our country. The only gridlock I've seen involves pensions, and that has nothing to do with ideas. That is the fault of "transactional politics." 
 
"Transactional politics" at the local level discourages good candidates from running and good administrators from applying for jobs. And at the local level, much of the reciprocity Rauch values (including both rewards and punishments) involves the misuse of office for personal gain. Dealing is valuable, but it is not in and of itself a good thing. It is a process. 
 
Another problem with Rauch's idea of "transactional politics" is that he does not clearly distinguish among "informal political structures and intricate systems of incentives" that well-functioning governments rely on. He uses this language after stating that, in the 20th century, politicians "found ways to do business without recourse to no-show jobs, featherbedding, kickbacks, and insider dealing." That's news to me. And what about conflicts of interest, nepotism and cronyism, pay to play, the revolving door, and the misuse of government property, personnel, and confidential information? These informal structures and incentives distort government and business spending, and create a sense of unfairness and corruption that undermines the public's trust in those who manage their communities. It is true that well-run machines, like Chicago's, have shared jobs out among races and ethnic groups, but many aim to further racial and ethnic goals at the expense of those of other races or ethnic groups. 
 
Insiders and Outsiders 
One of the worst things about Rauch's support for machines is his valuing them for their ability to set boundaries between insiders and outsiders. He overvalues loyalty, which is the basis for secrecy, cover-ups, and the feeling of entitlement and impunity that breaks down the barriers of many government officials to engaging in ethical misconduct. And he finds outsiders to be little more than obstacles to making the necessary deals. He speaks positively of "marginalizing" outsiders. But outsiders, at least at the local level, often represent people who otherwise would not be heard. If they let themselves be co-opted, they may not be able to effectively represent their constituents. Outsider involvement is not the problem that Rauch paints it, at least not at the local level. 
 
Focus on Campaign Finance 
Another principal problem with Rauch's argument, when applied at the local level, is that he focuses on campaign finance. At the local level, campaign contributions (including in-kind contributions) primarily come from those with financial interests or party or union involvement. There is little ideological money involved. Therefore, political insiders' control of money and other "tools of leadership" have not been weakened. The bigger issues involve conflicts of interest and the appearance of buying influence tied to specific financial benefits, but Rauch ignores this area of government ethics. 
 
When Rauch condemns reformers for "contributing to the rise of privatized pseudo-machines that make governing more difficult and politics less accountable," he is referring to the increased power of billionaires in federal elections. At the local level, they have, at least so far, been ineffective and, <a href="http://www.cityethics.org/content/old-and-new-local-independent-spendin… one case (Coralville, IA), counterproductive</a>. 
 
So, what have local government reformers done wrong? How have their attempts to end machines made it more difficult to govern? Machines work more smoothly because they don't have to deal with a lot of the mess that accompanies a democratic form of government, which does not favor efficiency. 
 
Strong Mayors 
Although Rauch acknowledges that the "machines" of the past had lots of problems, he seems to care not only about getting bills passed, but also about personal power. Besides Tammany Hall, his other municipal example involves Richmond, VA which, according to him, went from a failed council-manager government to a mayor-council government that failed because it was led by an "outsider" to a successful mayor-council government where a "professional" mayor took control of all the parts of the government and got things done. 
 
The implication of this is that the council-manager form of government, which puts the principal political power in the hands of a body rather than an individual, is problematic. This contrasts with Rauch's positive view of past bipartisan "political machines" in Congress that got things done. Why can't a nonpartisan council get things done in the same manner? Why is a strong mayor a necessary element for a successful local "machine" in Rauch's sense, but not for a successful national "machine"? 
 
Accountability and Transparency 
It appears that Rauch is stuck on a narrow definition of "accountability." A strong mayor is more directly accountable than a council, because in a council no one individual is fully responsible (although the chair, often the mayor, often has special authority and accountability). But there are other kinds of accountability, including accountability to an independent ethics commission. 
 
And there can be no true accountability without transparency, without the public and the news media knowing what really is happening, so that they can ask questions and influence outcomes. But Rauch feels that too much transparency makes it difficult to deal, that deals have to be made out of the public eye. But if no one knows how a deal was made, how can the public decide whom to hold accountable for it, if they ever know about the deal at all? 
 
The fact is that, even where there is a lot of transparency, deals are still made outside the public eye, in phone calls and informal meetings with less than a quorum of board members. One could argue that transparency gives board chairs and legislative leaders more rather than less power, because when attendance at deal meetings is limited, leaders are given more discretion and can be better blamed and credited for what occurs. 
 
A serious problem with Rauch's view of transparency is that he contrasts it to "privacy." Privacy is a strange concept with regard to public service. Government officials should have privacy with respect to their private lives, but not with respect to their public work. 
 
False Picture of Government Ethics 
Like most critics of government ethics, in the larger sense of the term, Rauch creates a straw man and ignores moderate, realistic reforms and actual programs. He criticizes a "zero-tolerance approach [that] criminalizes politics without actually ending corruption," but does not discuss alternatives beyond campaign finance reform. I've been criticizing the criminalization of politics for many years, but Rauch does not show any support for the many reformers who agree with me or for the great majority of ethics programs that are administrative in nature and focus on training, advice, and disclosure rather than enforcement. 
 
It is also not accurate to say that government reformers condemn "transactional politics." They only condemn certain aspects, and the reforms that have been instituted have only had a limited affect on how government affairs are transacted. After all, there are still many local machines, even if their methods are less crude than Tammany Hall's. 
 
Solutions 
Rauch puts forth as his first solution to the problems he sees "reducing the artificial fundraising advantages that current law gives to political amateurs and outsiders." This means opening up limits on political contributions, eliminating coordination restrictions, and even "deliberately advantaging the [political] parties in the fundraising game." 
 
I don't know of a single city machine that has lost power due to its inability to raise money. And since most machines are in one-party cities, advantaging parties would be of little value. But it is telling that, as with most progressives, Rauch focuses on campaign finance solutions. 
 
Rauch also wants to expand "private spaces for negotiations," by which he means weakening transparency rules. There is more than enough play in transparency rules for secret negotiations. Most deal-making, grant-making, and bill and contract-specification writing already goes on behind closed doors. There is no need for less transparency. 
 
Finally, Rauch wants to change the conversation, to make it clear that direct participation of citizens is not a good thing for government, but "favors extremists and independent operators." There can be too much participation, particularly with respect to voting on too many positions and too many referendums and initiatives. But, at the local level, direct participation is the lifeblood of government. Citizens are needed to fill the many boards and commissions. Citizens act as watchdogs, especially where there is little media coverage. Citizens ask important questions and remind officials whom they are working for, whom they are responsible to. 
 
The best way not to favor truly harmful independent operators in government would be an effective government ethics and lobbying oversight program. 
 
Rauch also wants to change the view that small donors are a good thing and that, therefore, their contributions should be subsidized. They "tend to be polarized and polarizing," he wrote. Not at the local level they aren't. Few people without economic interests in government business make any contributions in local elections. Encouraging more people to make small contributions gets them involved in local elections and increases the likelihood that they will vote, educate themselves about local candidates, and participate in campaigns. 
 
Finally, Rauch wants to end the "war on corruption," which he calls, infelicitously, "that Tasmanian Devil of entrenched assumptions, the tail-chasing, tree-munching, all-consuming, ever expanding, and by now entire counterproductive war on corruption." I can't respond to this, because Tasmanian Devils don't say much, at least not <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FOTlNOZB4Zo">in the cartoons</a>. 
 
I will simply end by noting that our democracy is messy. To me, that is the most politically realistic thing I can think of. Efficiency is a great thing, but it's not very realistic, and it is not worth having a machine, or an authoritarian government, to achieve it. 
 
Robert Wechsler 
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics 
 
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Summer Reading: Jonathan Rauch on the Positives of Machines

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