Influence vs. Pay to Play
A big controversy surrounding the race for mayor of Honolulu is
focused on the state's pay-to-play culture of the past, and what pay
to play actually is. The reason for this is that a former Hawaii
governor is running for mayor, and he is being supported by Bob Watada, a former
state Campaign Spending Commission executive director who is
known for bringing the state's pay-to-play culture to its knees
during his 1994-2005 term in office.<br>
<br>
According to <a href="http://archives.hawaiireporter.com/story.aspx?79b10837-8e7f-427e-bd34-c…; target="”_blank”">a
November 2005 look at the executive director's career in the
Hawaii <i>Reporter</i></a>, he fined nearly 100 companies for making
"false name" contributions and excessive contributions primarily to
the then Honolulu mayor and the then governor, who is now running
for mayor. "The city prosecutor and federal government took over
some of Watada’s cases charging corporate executives of those
companies with money laundering, making illegal campaign
contributions and tax evasion. The companies participated in the
scheme to boost their chances of getting government contracts,
concession rights or zoning clearances. Watada also either headed
investigations, or uncovered information, that led to a long line of
powerful politicians going to jail."<br>
<br>
One politician who was not prosecuted was the then governor.
Watada says that he was clean, that he didn't know who made
contributions, that he didn't know about the illegal contributions made to his compaign,
and that the fact that he closed down his committee rather than
returning illegal contributions was common practice and perfectly legal.<br>
<br>
According to <a href="http://www.hawaiireporter.com/community-leaders-denounce-prp-hawaiis-la…; target="”_blank”">an
article last week in the Hawaii <i>Reporter</i></a>, Watada said that
those attacking the mayoral candidate "think that a governor or
mayor can stop ‘pay to play.’ This is really
disingenuous. Pay to play is not illegal, and is a part
of the political process in almost every campaign for elective
office in the United States. Simply, people, contractors,
unions and most other donors make contributions (PAY) in the
hopes or expectation that they will get something in return
(PLAY) once the candidate is elected into office." According to the
article, "Watada said the real illegal problem is 'quid pro
quo,' a direct connection between the giving and receiving."<br>
<br>
In the same article, an executive with one of the rail system
contractors involved in pay to play described the system
differently:<blockquote>
Pay-to-play is real and has been part of Hawaii's political culture
for decades. ... I retired in May of 2010 and witnessed favoritism
in the A&E [architects & engineers] selection process on
numerous occasions, practiced by previous administrations in both
the state and city governments. Few bothered to challenge the
awarding of contracts to those who 'paid to play' because speaking
out would guarantee no future work on government projects.</blockquote>
<b>Influence</b><br>
Watada's view of pay to play is of companies doing everything they
can in the hope that they will get something in return, and that's
okay as long as there isn't a quid pro quo, that is, a promise that
they will get something in return. I call Watada's view of pay to play an attempt to influence. It is
common, usually legal (except when the contributions or gifts are
illegal), but undermines trust in government because it makes it
look as if there is a market in getting officials to hand out contracts to those who support them. There is an implication that the public will pay
more for their services due to the contributors' influence on officials.<br>
<br>
<b>Pay to Play</b><br>
The contractor's view of pay to play is that
government officials showed favoritism in return for contributions
(and possibly other gifts), and that because these gifts were
expected, no one who wanted a contract could either fail to make the
gifts or speak out publicly about them or the favoritism they led to. This is the traditional view of pay to play. It
differs in two important ways from Watada's view. One, the
initiative is taken by the officials, not the companies. Requests
are made to companies seeking benefits from the government (often
the requests are tacit; the expectations are commonly known) to make
sizeable contributions and often other sorts of gifts to officials
responsible for approving or with influence over contracts, permit
requests, and grants. Two, there is a culture of intimidation that
prevents companies from making the system public, as the contractor
suggests.<br>
<br>
<b>The Difference</b><br>
Here's another way of looking at the difference. It is easy for
officials to deal with attempts to influence: all they have to
do is return contributions from those the public might see
as seeking to influence them. They can even say at the beginning of
a campaign that they will not accept contributions from any
individual or company that does business or is seeking business with
the city or county. Candidates actually do this.<br>
<br>
Of course, it puts them at a disadvantage. But one, the ones given
such contributions are usually incumbents, so they already have an
advantage. And two, they can always push for public campaign
financing, which will make the contributions of contractors and
developers much less important.<br>
<br>
With influence, the official is in control. Despite what Watada says,
a mayor <i>can</i> stop what Watada calls "pay to play". He can stop it by
choosing not to accept anything from anyone seeking to influence him. He
can stop it by creating a culture of openness and the responsible
handling of conflicts in his government. A mayor has more control over a city's ethics environment than anyone else.<br>
<br>
With pay to play, the official takes control. He misuses his
position to strengthen his position. He actively creates or sustains
the culture in his government, a culture of favoritism and
intimidation.<br>
<br>
Contractors and their attorneys are always letting themselves off
the hook when it comes to influence/pay to play. They always say what happened was pay to play. What I hate to see
is a government ethics professional letting officials off the hook
with talk about quid pro quos. Whether it is influence or pay to
play, officials have a special obligation to the public not to
participate, not to create the appearance that their influence and
decisions are for sale. Or worse. After all, their only argument for inaction is the need to
ensure their personal victory. As long as there are alternative ways
to victory, there is no responsible argument for inaction.<br>
<br>
Robert Wechsler<br>
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics<br>
<br>
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