Summer Reading: Corruption and American Politics III - John Parrish's Essay
The third essay in <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Corruption-American-Politics-Michael-Genovese/dp/…; target="”_blank”"><i>Corruption and American Politics</i></a>, a collection edited by Michael
A. Genovese and Victoria A. Farrar-Meyers (Cambria, 2011), is by John M. Parrish, a professor at Loyola Marymount University. The essay, which has the intriguing title
"Benevolent Skulduggery," starts out by asking the question, Is corruption ever
justified? My short answer is that there are moral dilemmas where
one must choose the least of two or more bad ways of handling a
matter. But in most cases, this should be done openly and after
consultation with neutral and knowledgeable individuals.<br>
<br>
But Parrish's focus is more on "accepting a shady deal to
facilitate one's chances of winning an election with vital public
policy consequences." The problem with this formulation is that the
average candidate believes that, if she loses the election,
something dire will happen to the community. Few people can honestly
make this judgment themselves, nor can those around a candidate.
Once a candidate or her advisers put a matter in these terms, I
think they're well on their way to justifying ethical misconduct.<br>
<br>
Fortunately, Parrish moves beyond this example to make some very valuable observations about preferential treatment and institutional corruption.<br>
<br>
The case study Parrish considers was originally formulated by Michael Walzer, but Parrish looks at it in
light of <a href="http://www.cityethics.org/content/institutional-corruption-conference-i…; target="”_blank”">Mark Warren's definition of corruption as duplicitous
exclusion</a>. A "pure-hearted" politician finds that, in order to win an
election, he must make a deal with a ward boss regarding a school
construction contract. Parrish finds three types of corruption in
this case. One, citizens as voters and deliberators are
duplicitously excluded from knowing about the candidate's commitment
and, therefore, his character; knowing about it, they might choose
to vote for someone else or, at least, provide less support to the
candidate. Two, citizens are duplicitously excluded from influence
in the contract matter; if they knew about the deal, they might
complain about the contractor's interests being given special
consideration. And three, citizens are duplicitously excluded from
getting the best possible price for the public project (and other
contractors are also being duplicitously excluded from a fair
competitive bid).<br>
<br>
<b>For Lack of a Reason</b><br>
Democracy theory in recent years has emphasized the importance of
government officials providing honest reasons for their decision.
Without this, it is impossible for the public to participate
effectively, in deliberation or in voting.<br>
<br>
Parrish applies this idea to government ethics. "[I]t is the lack of
any ethically respectable reason for the inequalities it produces
that provides the prima facie argument against discriminatory
corruption. In Walzer's case, the corrupt contractor asks to be
treated differently from other bidders and to receive special
preferences in comparison with other members of the community. Yet
neither the contractor nor the candidate can give an appropriate
reason for this unequal treatment, at least not one that will stand
the test of public scrutiny. As a consequence ... inequalities
without reasons must be hidden or at a minimum glossed over in some
way."<br>
<br>
<b>Institutional Corruption</b><br>
Parrish also notes how this ties in with institutional
corruption: "Discriminatory corruption is easier to justify,
easier to keep beneath the surface of public discourse, when it
exists systematically amidst practices that are at once pervasive
and hypocritical. When one public servant depends abjectly on the
financial favor and political muscle of a private person or
interest, his corruption is easy to spot; when practically every
public servant shares a similar dependence — and when they are able
to pass this off as a benign practice unworthy of attention or
critique — their actions somehow come to require less justification
than in the individual instance."<br>
<br>
Finally, Parrish notes something very important about this sort of
corruption, which I will be dealing with at further length in my
next book review:<blockquote>
Citizens are entitled to the ear of their representative, but when
listening becomes a commodity rather than a privilege of citizenship
we have entered into the territory of discriminatory corruption.</blockquote>
Robert Wechsler<br>
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics<br>
<br>
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