Lawrence Lessig, who heads the Safra Center and hosted the event,
started by defining institutional corruption as:
<blockquote>A situation where influences within an economy of influence tend to
weaken the effectiveness of an institution, especially by weakening
public trust of the institution.</blockquote>
This is an academic definition. What's important to take from it is
(1) the fact that institutional corruption is a situation rather
than an act (and it is hard to deal with IC situations in the usual
criminal-like enforcement mechanisms of a government ethics
program); (2) that in institutions such as governments there is an
"economy of influence," that is, running for office requires funding
(campaign, party, and PAC contributions), and those who provide the
funds generally get influence disproportionate from others by doing
so; and (3) that even when the influence is legal, it weakens public
trust, and this makes government, and its democratic processes, less
effective.<br>
<br>
This is a narrow definition that focuses on campaign finance
and lobbying issues. At the local level, despite the fact that even
most elected officials run inexpensive campaigns and do not depend
on lobbyists and, therefore, do not participate in an economy of
influence that is powered by contributions, or even political
parties in many cases, there is still institutional corruption, that
is, legal and sometimes pervasive conduct that creates an appearance
of impropriety and undermines public trust.<br>
<br>
<b>Mistakes Made in Diagnosing Institutional Corruption</b><br>
Dennis Thompson, a Harvard professor whose book <i>Ethics in Congress</i> I wrote
about in <a href="http://www.cityethics.org/search/node/ethics%20in%20congress" target="”_blank”">several
posts last year,</a> spoke about diagnosing institutional
corruption. He pointed out the three most commonly made mistakes
that are made in doing this. One is the confusion of IC with its
consequences. Consequences, such as the level of public trust in a
local government, are not good indicators of IC, because there are
other factors that lead to the same consequences. There can, for
example, be high public trust because corruption is secret, or
corruption is known, but not seen as corruption. On the other hand,
the disclosure of conflicts can, in the short run, undermine public
trust, even though it leads to a good ethics environment.<br>
<br>
A second mistake that is made is to confuse personal and
institutional interests, for example, bribes and campaign
contributions. Institutional interests are those that are a
necessary part of doing the job, and for most elected officials this
includes the requirement to raise campaign funds. Bribes are only
sought for personal reasons. Policies to prevent bribes are very
different from policies to prevent the corruption of a legislative
body through the raising of campaign funds. The latter requires finding
different means of institutional support, such as public financing
of elections.<br>
<br>
The third mistake is the conclusion many reach that only the system
is to blame, not the individuals involved in it. Or, in the
alternative, that every politician is a crook. Instead, pressure
should be placed on individual officials to make changes in the
system. Not all solutions to institutional corruption need be
radical as some argue based on their mistaken beliefs.<br>
<br>
The big dilemma in reforming political institutions, according to
Thompson, continuing to employ the medical metaphor he loves, is who will
administer the treatment. Those who have the capacity and power to
change the institution must be enlisted to improve their own health.
But these same individuals are the ones with the greatest interest
in preserving the status quo. Ethics reform is difficult. That's why
it usually requires a big scandal to move forward more than a baby
step at a time. But there are ways to do it. I have devoted a long chapter of my forthcoming book to the various approaches to ethics reform.<br>
<br>
Robert Wechsler<br>
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics<br>
<br>
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