Blind Spots II — Motivated Blindness
Although we have more trouble seeing our own unethical behavior than we
do seeing others' unethical behavior, Max H. Bazerman and Ann
E. Tenbrunsel, the authors of the new book <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Blind-Spots-Whats-Right-about/dp/0691147507" target="”_blank”">Blind
Spots:
Why
We
Fail
to
Do
What's Right and What to Do about It</a>, have found that
people have a tendency "to overlook the unethical
behavior of others when it is not in their best interest to notice the
infraction." They call this "motivated blindness."<br>
<br>
The principal example the authors give for motivated blindness is
auditors who show a strong bias toward the interests of their clients.
"Rather than making a conscious decision to favor their
clients, the participants assimilated information about the target
company in a biased way. … Auditors became more like their clients
than they would be if no such motivation existed; as a result, they are
unlikely to see the unethical actions and biases in their clients'
behavior." Other elements in creating motivated blindness include fear,
incentives, organizational loyalty, and organizational culture.<br>
<br>
In the context of local government ethics, motivated blindness
can best be seen when local government attorneys are advising their
"clients," that is, officials, especially top officials and local
legislators, on ethics matters. Too often, they give officials the
advice that is in their personal interest (that is, what will not hurt
their personal reputation) rather than the advice that
is in the public interest.<br>
<br>
It is generally assumed that this bias is intentional. But
I agree with the authors that often it is not conscious at all. This is
why it is so important to constantly remind local government attorneys,
both staff and outside counsel, that they are not representing the
people they consult with, but rather the city, county, or agency, that
is, the public. The people they consult with just happen to be sitting
in their positions. When it comes to possible conflicts between such
officials' personal interest and the public interest, it is important
that local government attorneys consciously recognize that their client is not quite the same as the client they help with writing an
ordinance or
handling a suit against the local government.<br>
<br>
In many situations, local government attorneys need to recognize that,
considering the personal, business, and political relationship they
have with officials, they should not be giving officials ethics advice at
all, because they themselves are conflicted, even if neither the local
ethics code
nor the rules of professional conduct prohibit the attorney
from providing the advice. <br>
<br>
The authors say that our "audit system
makes it psychologically impossible, because of motivated blindness,
for even the most honest auditors to make objective judgments; cases of
audit failure are inevitable." Unbiased audits are
unlikely as long as auditors are hired and fired by the
companies they audit. This is equally true of local government
attorneys, and even ethics officers and ethics commission staff who are
selected by local
government officials.<br>
<br>
This is one reason why those who give or prepare ethics advice should be appointed
by and report only to an ethics commission. This removes the
organizational loyalty, incentives, pressures, and fears that lead people within a local government to be blinded by their relationships with officials.<br>
<br>
Robert Wechsler<br>
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics<br>
<br>
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